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Transformative Learning and the forms that transform: towards a psychosocial theory 
of recognition using auto/biographical narrative research  
Abstract 
In this paper I interrogate the changing forms that may be fundamental to transformative 
learning and how these are best chronicled and understood. Drawing on auto/biographical 
narrative research, I challenge the continuing primacy of a kind of overly disembodied, 
decontextualized cognition as the basis of transformation. Notions of epistemic shifts, for 
instance, and their central importance, can lack sufficient or convincing grounding in the 
complexities of whole people and their stories. I develop, instead, a psychosocial theory of 
recognition, drawing, especially, on critical theory and psychoanalysis: in this perspective, 
the experiencing self, in relationship, constitutes, agentically, the form that transforms, while 
fundamental changes in mind-set are deeply intertwined with shifts in inner-outer 
psychosocial dynamics.   I challenge, in the process, some conventional boundaries between 
cognition and emotion, self and other, the psychological and socio-cultural, as well as 
collective and individual learning.  
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Introduction 
I want to focus in this paper on the forms that transforms when thinking about the nature and 
parameters of transformative learning (TL): a question originally posed by Kegan (2000) in 
his significant contribution to the literature. I have a concern – shared by many others (for 
example, Brookfield, 2000 and Newman, 2012) – that the concept of TL is in danger of being 
evacuated of real meaning and significance, too easily reduced to either a marketing slogan or 
an empty signifier without substance or distinctive terms of reference. Michael Newman goes 
as far as to propose, provocatively, ‘that we strike the phrase transformative learning from 
the educational lexicon altogether’ (Newman, 2012, p.51). For TL to mean something 
significant, distinct, worth preserving, in response, it has to encompass fundamental 
ontological as well as epistemological changes in the learner. Changes such as the capacity to 
internalise new and radically different ideas and to question the taken for granted and 
oppressive forces in a life; and to claim space agentically as well as compose greater personal 
authority (West, 1996). Yet how to frame and theorise such changes – and to decide what is 
fundamental – also remains a matter of debate. For Mezirow, (2000), the answer lay in a 
metacognitive application of critical thinking.  Critical thinking transforms a mind-set, to be 
replaced by a different, more assertive world view.  
 
Any mind-set is of course composed of values, beliefs, feelings as well as concepts, but 
transformation, at core, in this view, has to do with fundamental change in epistemic 
assumptions. This may reflect the continuing influence of cognitivist understandings of 
change processes in the literature (Illeris, 2007, 2014). Modern philosophy, and educational 
theorising, in its search for epistemological certainty and clarity, tends, still, following 
Descartes, to split mind from body and transcendence may be seen to lie, if implicitly, in a 
kind of escape from our animal, corporeal base. Notions of TL may remain trapped in such a 
mind-set, rooted in Enlightenment assumptions. Autonomy, for Kant, that pre-eminent 
Enlightenment thinker, lay in rising above desire and acting according to intellectual and 
moral norms that are themselves created by the exercise of reason (Gaitanidis, 2012). Deep 
suspicion of the body and of feeling, and even resistance to engaging with subjectivity itself, 
or semantic levels of experience, remain embedded in contemporary thought, (partly, 
perhaps, because of their insusceptibility to direct empirical observation or modelling 
(Bainbridge and West, 2012)).  
 
All of which matters because Mezirow’s understanding of the forms that transform 
(Mezirow, 2000; Dirkx, Mezirow & Cranton, 2006) seems, if anything, at least in one recent 
interpretation, to have shifted from greater sympathy towards a subjectively and 
psychoanalytically attuned sensibility – where thinking and psychic change are intertwined - 
towards more emphasis, in later work, on metacognition (Hunt, 2013).  However, while 
radical changes in mind-set may be an important dimension of transformation, the question 
remains as to what makes radical cognitive changes possible, including challenges to 
oppressive forces, whether external or internal? Do we need a more fundamental level of 
analysis than cognition alone? A theory of recognition might provide more of a holistic 
analytical frame of reference. 
It was Robert Kegan, as observed, who originally posed the question of ‘what ‘form’ 
transforms?’ His answer was that of a ‘constructive development psychologist’, drawing, 
among other things, on the writings of Ibsen as well as specific adult learner biographies. TL, 
for Kegan, involves ‘a shift away from being “made up by” the values and expectations of 
one’s “surround” (family, friends, community, culture) that get uncritically internalised, 
towards developing an internal authority that makes choices about the external values and 
expectations according to one’s own self-authored belief system.’ (Kegan, 2000, p. 59).  There 
is, like Mezirow, an emphasis on epistemic change as an essential element in transformation: 
for Nora, in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, who Kegan quotes at length, there is a life changing 
challenge to the patriarchal authority of a husband, and through him, to a whole culture. This 
is the beginning of a journey into becoming more of a questioning, agentic, self-authored 
being: encompassing self-knowledge and interrogating the received wisdoms by which a life 
has been lived. Yet Kegan himself points to the limitations of a purely intellectual or 
cognitive approach: the qualitative evolution of mind, as he framed it, involves more than the 
‘bloodless’ experience of notions like cognitive shift: rather it often entails a wrenching, no 
less, of self from cultural surround and into new sets of relationships, including with the 
symbolic order (Kegan, 2000, p. 67). I want to consider aspects of human wrenching, care-
fully, and in depth, through the eyes of learners, using auto/biographical narrative enquiry. I 
draw on psychoanalysis and critical theory to illuminate and theorise the complexity of the 
forms that transform.  
 
Others too have challenged cognitive reductionism: Illeris (2014) uses the notion of identity 
and the necessity of building and maintaining a ‘balanced identity’, in a liquid, fragile, 
runaway world (p146). The concept of identity, he notes, has been elaborated in both 
psychology and sociology, over 3 decades or more. Engaging with inevitable shifts of 
identity, in liquid modernity – across life stages and in changing motivation, for instance – 
could serve as the prime focus in considering forms that transform. Interestingly, Illeris 
rejects employing concepts of the self, and changing experiences of self in relationship, as a 
potential focus, given what he sees to be an overly psychologistic and or essentialist baggage. 
This may connect to wider European suspicion, (if not exclusively so), about over 
individualising and over psychologising TL, to the neglect of ideology and power in shaping 
and constraining subjects. There is in this view a need for a more collective and even 
politicised understanding of transformation, grounded in critical theory and challenging 
ideology and oppression (Brookfield, 2000). Reference is made to historical traditions of 
popular education, for instance, and the importance of the collective wrenching of selves 
from oppressive cultures and ideologies, in struggles to build a more socially just world.  
 
From a different perspective, John Dirkx does focus on struggles for self as well as meaning, 
with reference to the inner world. He conceives TL to be a dimension of profound, yet 
unconscious psychic shifts, in struggles to be more of a whole person (Dirkx et al, 2006). He 
takes us, in the process, into deeper, embodied territory, arguing that the forms that transform 
are located within changing experiences of self. Drawing on Jungian analytic psychology, the 
forms that transforms include shifting cast of characters in the inner world: of changing 
dynamics between, for instance, a censor, a judge and the young child, or maybe between a 
trickster and or deviant, in relation to the persona that we present to the world. In such 
changes, the quality of self, mediating and responding to such interactions, can be 
transformed, in life enhancing ways. John Dirkx writes: ‘Voices from this inner world 
continuously nag me with questions about the meaning of my life, of the work that I do, of 
relationships’, even following transformative moments (Dirkx, Mezirow & Cranton, 2006, p. 
127). Yet such voices, from the depths, also bring recognition of achievements, of greater 
self-knowledge and acceptance; of peace and ‘visceral understanding’ of beauty. Like Dirkx, 
I want to interrogate such self dynamics further, but using a different if potentially 
complementary frame. I want to build better understanding of the dynamics of socio-cultural 
and psychic worlds, of others and self in relation, including self to the symbolic order, and the 
capacity to play with and internalise new ideas.   
 
The paper is grounded in auto/biographical narrative enquiry, in a clinical style, (see below), 
and, as stated, an interdisciplinary theoretical repertoire, shaped by dialogue between critical 
theory and psychoanalysis. In such a perspective, struggles for self – a contingent, socially 
conditioned, historically situated, deeply relational yet also developmental rather than 
traditionally essentialist self – are located within dynamics of recognition. These operate at a 
number of interconnected inter-subjective and socio-cultural levels: illuminating them can 
help us build better, more holistic understanding of forms that transform, and of how the will 
to know, and be, may be constrained by oppressive forces but can be liberated in new 
qualities of relationship.    
 
Towards a theory of recognition 
In my auto/biographical narrative work among diverse groups of marginalised learners 
managing change and disorientating dilemmas, I have frequently concluded that people, in 
effect, are re-negotiating selves and stories in new qualities of relationship with others and 
with the symbolic order. Students can find narrative, intellectual, emotional and human 
resources, or ‘objects’ in psychoanalytic language, out there, in educational settings, which 
can be internalised through processes of projective identification. They may find new people 
who value them, in new ways, and whose views and achievements are respected. People, or 
for that matter a new idea, might become a good internal object, because of their (or its) 
resonance in illuminating, in meaningful ways, oppressive and or disabling experience and 
how to transcend this. Such objects can become part of a changing internal dynamic. 
(Although a new idea may also be resisted for fear of the implications: like mature women 
students who may initially reject feminism because it raises disturbing questions as to how a 
life has been lived and rationalised hitherto (West, 1996)). Auto/biographical narrative 
research has illuminated some of the deep ambivalence and ambiguity that may lie at the 
heart of really significant learning. There may be strong dynamics in play - rooted in 
primitive (that is early) experience, including memory in feeling (rather than more conscious 
processes) - of vulnerability, and the fear of exposure to powerful others. There may also be 
anxiety about depending on others, too, which may be problematic viewed through life  
histories of abusive interactions with authority (West, 2009). There is a potentially more 
complex theory of self here – drawing on psychoanalytic object relations theory - of how 
intersubjective dynamics get translated into intrasubjective ones, including abusive, life and 
self denying processes. Yet these dynamics can change in the light of new qualities of 
relational experience in which the self feels more legitimate, understood and recognised in 
the transitional spaces represented by education (West, 1996; Winnicott, 1971).  
 
In other words, psychoanalytic object relations focuses on people in relationship, and the 
interplay of inner and outer dynamics, in considering forms that transform. The metaphor of 
psyche is one of an intersubjective theatre, in which some characters dominate and may 
negatively affect our relationships, including to the symbolic order (Frosh, 1991). Yet casts of 
characters can change. Donald Winnicott (1971) focused on the role of the (m)other and play 
in earlier change processes. He derived his ideas from infant and (m)other observations, over 
many years. He conceived play, and thinking, as deeply creative, relational activities, 
involving the imagination, heart as well as mind (although there is potentially a dark, 
destructive side to play, as André Green (2005) has observed). Play, however, requires what 
Winnicott called good enough spaces between people: a sort of neutral area where anxieties 
can be managed and it feels safe enough to take risks. Experiments with self, including with 
the stories we tell - about who we are, have been and might be - can take place.  In such 
processes, the response, encouragement and understanding of others – a kind of emotionally 
attuned recognition – is essential.   
 
Yet change can be difficult because such processes often reach back to earlier struggles for 
separation.  If relationships have not been good enough, as Winnicott famously framed it, we 
can become overly preoccupied with the other, and her well-being, in what may be self-
denying ways. Winnicott applied these ideas - on separation, play and selfhood - to adult life. 
When, for instance, the taken for granted is shaken, we may hold rigidly to existing ideas and 
relationships and retreat to the culturally and cognitively familiar. We may struggle to play 
with new ideas, because they threaten our sense of who we are and make the wrenching of 
self from context seem unbearable. Anxiety can be a paralyzing companion, making the work 
of selfhood impossible. We may, like Janus, face both ways, in a struggle to separate from the 
old. What we term the ‘child’ in the adult may, consciously and unconsciously, be fearful as 
to whether s/he can cope, be good enough, or legitimate, in the eyes of significant others. As 
older learners, there can be anxiety – as past and present merge - that their ideas and 
contributions in a seminar room might be treated with disrespect or are never going to be 
good enough. And yet the good enough instructor or fellow student, in coming alongside, and 
through empathic understanding, encouragement and giving time, can contain such primitive 
anxieties, and allow some space to process new and radical ideas (West, 1996).       
 
Using Winnicott as well as Freud, the critical theorist Axel Honneth takes these notions 
further, and builds a socio-cultural as well as intersubjective understanding of how the 
freedom of the will may be energised, encompassing primitive but also wider interactions. He 
reminds us, initially, of the profound anthropological insight at the heart of psychoanalysis: 
that human beings, relative to other mammals, are born prematurely, and rely absolutely on 
others for survival and well-being (Honneth, 2009). To transcend the inevitable anxiety 
generated in separation processes requires, drawing on Winnicott, loving relationships, in 
which the infant feels understood, yet encouraged to take risks and to engage fulsomely with 
the world. If there is some wrenching, there is the relational capacity to transcend this via 
‘recognition’. However, the infant, he notes, drawing on Winnicott, may have to work hard, 
at a psychic and relational level, to ensure the other’s availability, at the expense of donning 
false or compliant behaviour. We can acquire, largely unconsciously, false self mantles to 
please and appease. It becomes too frightening to express desire openly in diverse contexts: 
the freedom to feel, imagine, play and think is compromised.  
 Yet – and Honneth himself does not fully develop this point – primitive processes of 
recognition, in Winnicott’s sense, can happen in later life, including in higher education and 
family learning projects, as chronicled in my own work (West, 1996; 2009; Merrill and West, 
2009). If one experiences love, an ability to love one’s self and others, is developed. An 
identity (or selfhood) is being forged through receiving recognition. Without such a special 
relationship with another, it is impossible to become aware of one’s own uniqueness and thus 
experience a basic, positive sense of one’s abilities. Only by being recognized can we achieve 
a vibrant selfhood ((Honneth, 2007; Honneth, 2009; Fleming, 2010). Recognition, for 
Honneth, however, is more than an intimate experience but is also located in group and wider 
dynamics. If feelings of recognition – and the transformations that these can evoke - require 
love in the family or interpersonal sphere in order for the child, or adult, to develop basic 
self-confidence - self-respect is also needed. This can be generated when a person belongs to 
a community of rights and is recognized as a legally mature person. Through this comes the 
ability to participate in discussions and rituals of the group or wider institution, including 
being able to question taken for granted assumptions. Respect can then be more easily shown 
to others by acknowledging their rights. This form of recognition Honneth terms self-respect. 
Without rights there is no respect, to put it slightly differently. It is not just about having a 
good opinion of self but rather a sense of possessing a kind of shared dignity of persons as 
morally responsible agents and as capable of participating in public deliberations. The 
experiences of being honoured by a community for contributions leads to a third form of self-
relation which Honneth labels self-esteem. People with high self-esteem will reciprocate a 
mutual acknowledgement of each other’s contribution to the community. From this loyalty, 
greater social solidarity and even democratic vitality can grow (Fleming, 2011; Honneth, 
2007, p. 139).   
 
There is an issue in Honneth’s work to do with the quality of groups, with the potential to 
liberate or constrain, despite people feeling recognized. He draws in fact on Dewey to 
consider what qualities are required for a more democratic and liberating forms of 
relationship. However, some may find recognition in quite different, even racist 
organisations. There can be powerful destructive consequences, for self and learning, even if 
social esteem is forged, as in Nazi Germany, in small quasi-militaristic groups, whose codes 
of honour were based on violence (Honneth, 2007: 77). If we have become accustomed to 
thinking that the personal is political, in potentially liberating ways, the political may be 
deeply and dangerously personal too. Honneth (2007) notes how joining a fundamentalist 
group can seduce while closing down the possibilities of lifewide learning, in their rigid 
exclusions. Dewey (Honneth, 2007: 227-278) used the example of a robber band to indicate 
how particular groups constrain as well as recognise. The individual becomes a member but 
at the cost of repression of diverse possibilities for self and stories. ‘The good citizen’, 
Dewey observed, requires democratic communities to realise what s/he might be: s/he finds 
him or herself by full participation in family life, in the economy, in diverse artistic, cultural 
and political activities, in which there is free give and take. Instead of such positive 
dynamics, groups can involve rigid bounderies between self and other, and a sort of 
projective, reductive fantasy of the other, rather than stimulating self development through 
open engagement with what may be new, different and diverse.   
 
It is also interesting, as we noted in a recent article (West, Fleming & Finnegan, 2013), how 
Honneth (2007, 2009) re-visited Freud’s work and critiqued the contemporary trend to move 
away from an imperative to understand ourselves by reference to deep engagement with our 
past. Honneth argued that psychoanalysis in fact makes an important link between freedom, 
thinking and biographical work (Honneth, 2009, p. 126-156). Autobiographical work 
involves an ability through reflexive activity to overcome ‘the rupturedness of each 
individual’ and ‘only by a critical appropriation of her own process of formation does the 
human seize the opportunity provided to her for freedom of will’ (p. 127). In asking how 
freedom is attainable at all, Honneth asserts that we can re-appropriate our own will by means 
of recollective work. For Freud, according to Honneth, the individual is ‘less a self-
interpreting being than one who critically scrutinizes its own past to see whether traces of 
compulsions that have remained unconscious can be found in it’ (2009, p. 139). As the desire 
for freedom resides within, we can turn to our life-histories as valid expressions of our 
possibilities as humans. In his remarkable departure from Marxism in general and most of 
early critical theory, and even, to some extent, from Habermas, Honneth attempts to 
reimagine the emancipatory project of critical social theory. His solution is to forefront a 
theory of intersubjectivity and the ‘struggle for recognition’ (West, Fleming & Finnegan, 
2013). This takes us nearer to more fundamental forms that might transform. I will illustrate 
the utility of these ideas by reference to a case study taken from a European-wide research 
project on non-traditional learners in universities. 
 
RANLHE:  and psychosocial understanding of forms that transform 
RANLHE was the title given to a European Union financed study of ‘non-traditional learners’ 
in 7 European countries (RANLHE Lifelong Learning Project:  
http://www.ranlhe.dsw.edu.pl.) The research teams worked with samples of students and staff 
in different types of universities (mainly elite (or older) and reform (relatively new)) in each 
country. The term ‘non-traditional’ was used creatively to encompass students from 
backgrounds normally under-represented in universities: from particular ethnic minority 
communities, and or working class backgrounds, including being the first in a family at 
university; and or from the disabled and or migrant populations, etc. The research also 
encompassed younger and older learners. For present purposes, the focus is on one very 
poignant wrenching: the narrative of an asylum seeker who entered, dropped out, and then re-
entered university. The student was interviewed four times: at the beginning, the middle and 
at the end of three years at university in England. The basic questions we asked were what 
enabled someone like him to keep on keeping on at university, by reference to a life history, 
but also to do with experiences of transition and, perhaps, transformation. 
 
We encouraged such learners (there were 100 students involved with each of the 8 university 
research teams) to tell their stories, over time, as openly and honestly as they could. Learners 
engaged reflexively with their material, using transcripts and recordings, to identify themes 
and to think about them with us, as researchers. (It should be noted that there were different 
methodological orientations among the teams of researchers, from different countries, despite 
a common ‘biographical research’ label. One orientation was more ‘scientistic’ and 
objectivist; another, which reflects my own work, was more relational and auto/biographical 
in its framing, and worked in what we call ‘a clinical style’. In the former, attempts are made 
to minimise the presence of the researcher so as to build greater reliability and replicability in 
interviews; in the latter, the researcher’s presence, and especially her capacity to listen, care-
fully, and for the other to feel understood, is seen as an essential element in creating good 
enough space for exploratory, reflexive storytelling (West, 2011b)). Emphasis is also given to 
attentiveness and respectfulness and to taking time to build trust and mutual understanding; 
and to the importance of managing and containing anxieties, especially when working with 
unconfident people or difficult material. There is also a focus on the emotional qualities of 
the interaction between researcher and her subject, as part of making sense of narrative 
material (Merrill & West, 2009; Bainbridge & West, 2012). There are parallels in this kind of 
research with the ‘me-search’ of Robert Nash and colleagues (Nash and La Sha Bradley, 
2012; Nash, 2008), and their desire ‘to resist the conventional academic temptation to be 
‘objective’, stoical, qualified, subdued, abstract and distant’ (Nash and Bradley, 2012, p7). 
Rather it seeks to bring the ‘me’, or the subjectivity of the learner, into academic enquiry – in 
interaction with the ‘me’ of the researcher - to broaden understanding of knowing and for 
delineating themes that might connect with those among larger communities of learners (thus 
building some generalizability) as well as the literature. Participants, to emphasise, in our 
kind of research, are also involved in analysing their material, in this case by being given 
transcripts and recordings; and because of the longitudinal nature of the process – assuming 
relationships are good enough – we can think together about what is difficult to say, or may 
be missing from the account.  
 
Sensitising frames 
The RANLHE study played with three different but overlapping ‘theoretical sensitising 
frames’ in working with the learners. Bourdieu offered a sociological, social reproduction 
perspective when considering learner narratives and why particular students might struggle at 
particular kinds of university with some of the wrenching that might be involved. His work 
centres on the concept of habitus, which can be understood as a kind of embodied culture, in 
which ideas but also diverse practices and ways of being are in play (Bourdieu, 1990). Such 
cultures shape how people behave, speak, think and communicate one with another, and even 
how they deport themselves, as in studies of doctors and the medical training habitus 
(Sinclair, 1997). Bourdieu’s associated notion of disposition focuses on how people 
internalise an idea of what is expected of them in a particular habitus, in a particular family, 
community and or university. They will be more or less confident, dependent on class 
background, with the rituals of communication and language, for example, and with what is 
expected of them in writing, in presentations, and assessment; and even in self-deportment, as 
in seminars or a range of professional practice-based settings. Such expectations and ways of 
being in the world have been unconsciously internalised, in a previous education or social 
setting, while the habitus of particular middle class homes may be closer to the habitus of 
specific, especially ‘elite’ universities. People understand, intuitively, what is expected of 
them, of what counts as academic writing or discussion; and or how to engage in the diverse 
rituals that university involves, including rites of passage or ways of managing anxiety, via 
drugs, drink and or sex among younger students. Mature working class students, for instance, 
can struggle in particular universities, because their social and educational ‘capital’ can be 
someway removed from what is valued, understood or expressed in a new habitus; or they 
bring informal psychological capital, such as  resilience, derived from wider experience, 
which may initially go unrecognised. They can feel, in effect, in Bourdieu’s famous phrase, 
like ‘fish out of water’ (Bourdieu, 1990).  
However, Chapman Hoult (2009; 2012), among others, has observed that Bourdieu fails 
sufficiently to engage with how some students, from a non-traditional habitus, with 
apparently limited educational and social capital, nonetheless survive, prosper and become 
agentic in looking critically at the world and its assumptions, not least about people like 
them. They are able to play with new possibilities, and to manage some of the wrenching in 
their experiences. These are ‘les miraculés’, as Bourdieu frames it, ‘an uncharacteristically 
metaphysical turn’, as Chapman Hoult observes, ‘for a materialist’ such as him (Chapman 
Hoult, 2012, p. 9). How in fact they might prosper, or be transformed, even in a culturally 
exclusive habitus of an elite institution, is glossed over by Bourdieu. Of course he was aware 
of this phenomenon and argued, structurally, that these learners serve to mask systemic 
inequalities, as institutions proclaim ‘look, we are open to all the talents!’ Yet he fails to 
engage with ‘the subjective experience of objective possibilities’ among les miraculés: with 
those learners who buck the trend and prosper as well as challenge. It may be that Bourdieu’s 
view of capital is overly constrained – with neglect of psychological or experiential capital 
(such as lifelong learning) – because his gaze is too deterministic. We need, it is suggested, 
more fine grained, psychosocial analysis of the forms that may transform, or inhibit the play 
of self. 
Winnicott and Honneth 
We turned to the work of Winnicott (1971) and Honneth (2007; 2009), as noted, for help in 
thinking about potentially transitional and transformative processes. As noted, Winnicott 
placed the capacity for play and creativity, for letting go of anxieties, within the context of 
good enough relationships, as fundamental. Particular writers have used Winnicott’s concept 
of transitional space, when thinking of storytelling itself as a kind of transitional activity, a 
process of self negotiation, more or less productive of selfhood, depending on the recognition 
that may be received (Sclater, 2004). We can think of university, and also research, as a space 
for self-negotiation, and where struggles around separation and individuation take place. The 
stories people tell – including to researchers – can become vehicles for renegotiation, for a 
kind of narrative embodiment of selfhood, which is then recognised in the eyes and responses 
of significant others. Yet we also find evidence, in the stories people tell, of recognition 
forged in messo and macro level dynamics.  
 
Forms that transform: a case in point 
Take the case of Mathew, an asylum seeker, who knew something about wrenching in 
especially painful ways. He was forced to flee from his home, because of civil war, and from 
his family, on pain of death. When we (there were two of us in the interviews, working as a 
research team) first met him he described himself as a refugee and as a carer/student in his 
mid-thirties. He told us some of his life history and the difficulties he experienced as an 
Asylum Seeker: the outsider, the unrecognised, wrenched from one difficult milieu into a 
problematic other. He was now living in a materially poor part of London where racism could 
be rife. He talked fairly early on about his struggles with academic work, in an elite 
university, primarily because of limited confidence with English, (it was his fourth language). 
He had fled dangerous war zones. He also worked as an hourly paid-minimum wage carer 
since arriving on British soil, seeking asylum. He initially told us how he dropped out of an 
elite university, because of struggles with writing and misunderstanding the personal tutor 
system. He felt like a fish out of water, at times, in an unfathomable habitus, to mix 
metaphors. Sometime later, he took an Access to higher education course and made friends 
with an English couple teaching on the programme, in a college of further education. They 
supported him – at a time when he risked dropping out again – because of problems in the 
asylum status application process. They noticed, on the Access to higher education 
programme, that he kept missing sessions and asked what was wrong. He found it difficult to 
say, but later confided in them his problems, (made worse by political decisions to force 
asylum seekers to register at specified centres on a weekly basis).  
 
Mathew, like a number of students, inhabited a world where boundaries between full and 
part-time study, work and university, family and student life, were blurred: 
 
I do work…I used to work for agency but agencies shifts are not constant so I joined 
BUPA as a healthcare assistant. The rate is £5.90 for an hour... my partner is a nurse 
works shifts... I would be looking after the kids I have four boys... I’ve given up sleep 
lost hours of sleep to attend to the family and then education sometimes. I go to bed 
by three o’clock I get up by four o’clock five o’clock... I get up... prepare whatever 
I’ve got to take into [my] school, eat and shower the boys and leave them to dress by 
themselves and then go pack their bags/ lunch and leave home by 8 o’clock they’re 
supposed to start classes by 8.30 I mean 8.45 I’m supposed to start by 9... I have to 
drive to drop them to a neighbour who is very close to the school and who can just 
walk... so it’s very much more difficult than people might think. 
 
The two lecturers in the college were highly ‘significant others’, as Mathew struggled with 
self-confidence: he forged a close relationship with them, first as a student trying to work in 
written English, and then with his asylum application. They it was who recognised how he 
was missing sessions, and asked why. The two lecturers mobilised others, including a 
solicitor, to launch a campaign on Mathew’s behalf. Five years later, he was recognised as a 
British citizen in a citizenship ceremony, and they were there as witnesses. ‘They were like 
good parent figures’, he said, and he felt looked after and understood by them. He celebrated 
the ceremony itself, as a moment of transition, a benchmark of achievement and recognition 
in what could be a fragile world. And he worked hard to find supportive others in a new 
university in a more multi-cultural part of London. Finding a good personal tutor, and other 
sympathetic staff and students, was central to his progress.  
  
A public healthcare degree appealed because of the shortage of mental health workers in the 
National Health Service. In a third interview, some 9 months later, he looked back on earlier 
problems with language and writing:   
 
It is difficult because when we started in the first year they said to us OK this first 
year we give you the opportunity and accept your assignment as is... that has been 
changed because of the stage of second year so you’re now needing proof reading and 
that makes it difficult for people like me considering my background which I’m 
always constantly worried about how to translate my thoughts my ideas from one 
language to another, from Mende/Kissi/Creole languages, to African English, then to 
British English is something that makes it difficult for me… 
 
Yet cultural diversity, and the recognition this brought, was eventually seen by him to be a 
resource in negotiating a new identity. Mathew recognised the value of the languages he 
knew, viewing them as opportunities for better understanding of others’ worlds: 
 
Well from my languages from the various languages that I’ve gone through if you 
look at health for instance you cannot purely have a disease by itself. In that way you 
look at the medical models instead of looking at the social... or psychosocial aspect of 
it for the patient...having got some ideas about the… psychosocial aspect of health, 
taking it back to my past cultures... without making the connection with the social 
aspect you cannot treat the patient... so I bring in this system where I realise or begin 
to understand how I can actually help the sick from different cultures. 
 
In some cultures he said, mental illness was a spiritual problem, while in others it was 
transmitted intergenerationally. He was critical of the neglect of the socio-cultural, including 
the impact of poverty, in dominant approaches to health care and medicine. Over time, he 
also became a student advocate and community activist. He served as a representative for 
overseas students in the university and was a member of important committees. He learned to 
argue his case with university authorities, finding greater self-respect, self-esteem too, in the 
process (and in telling stories about it). He critiqued the neglect of minority communities and 
their experiences of health provision; and the failure to locate health and dis-ease, as noted, in 
a wider socio-political context. He felt increasingly recognised in diverse communities, and at 
different levels. Yet, Mathew’s is no simple linear tale. He continued to struggle with written 
assignments and in both the second and third interviews, the research itself became, for a 
moment, an explicit counselling space, in which he thought about his options and looked to 
us for guidance, in an emotionally needy way:   
 
I don’t want it to be a sign of weakness if I ask somebody to help me [proof reading 
my essay], that might make me a weak person... but there are a lot of resources which 
they call academic skills... I did it once, I’ve never done it again... but I have to 
change that because if I want to succeed I have to do that because the system is set up 
for that. 
 
He asked what we thought and the boundaries between biographical narrative interviewing 
and educational counselling, and between past and present, became blurred, and self-
confidence, once again, was fragile. A colleague researcher encouraged him to seek help and 
to overcome his reluctance.  He really wanted to know what she thought and began to talk at 
length. Admitting vulnerability was a dangerous business, he said, for someone like him, and 
he valued our meetings. He made the decision to try once more with an assignment. By the 
time of the fourth interview, he had organised a new pressure group for multi-cultural 
sensitivities in health care, building on his work as a student advocate at the university. 
Mathew became more of an agent, challenging taken for granted assumptions, and exploiting 
aspects of his own biography and experience. He became more of a self in the process: 
vulnerable as well as agentic, critical and empathic, playful as well as challenging. We have 
glimpses here of the dynamics of recognition, and of certain forms that transform. At the 
most intimate level, new experiences of self were created in new relationships, through  
feeling seen and valued, including in the research; at the messo level, self-respect was forged 
in the university, by being accepted in a community of rights and responsibilities; and at a 
more macro level, being recognised as an effective and valued political activist, in the wider 
university and beyond, helped create a relatively vibrant self-esteem. Yet, to repeat, this is no 
simple, linear progression, as might be implied in Honneth’s work: after the interviews, 
Mathew wrote a number of times, to us, asking for help with assignments, (which we gave). 
He constantly feared ‘failure’ in the rituals called academic writing. It remained hard to admit 
vulnerability in this regard and to ask for help. There is much material here that illuminates 
both the wrenching of self but also of the psychosocial forms that can transform, even in a 
sometimes hostile world (Kegan, 2000). A world of frequent displacement, of painful 
struggles over self, of a difficult, confusing habitus; yet also a world in which TL was 
possible, including finding a critical language to interrogate health provision. We have clear 
expressions of the role of love and wider cultural recognition, including in the symbolic, in 
illuminating what forms transform.  
 
Conclusion: forms that transform 
All of which takes us way beyond TL as a reified or empty mantra in education; or of the 
fixation with fundamental shifts in cognition alone. We move towards understanding more of 
the human complexity in forms that transform; and how TL requires new kinds of 
interdisciplinary understanding of whole lived experience. It includes how and why we may 
resist some of the work that makes TL possible; of how, in places like South London, we can 
experience the power of racism and oppressive populist politics that would deny us asylum; 
and space for being, thinking, and for citizenship: offering, instead, profound forms of 
disrespect that violate our ‘intuitive notions of justice in everyday experience’ as Honneth 
framed it (Honneth, 2007, p.71). Learning, of any significant kind, may be difficult when we 
are labelled as other, alien, threatening, and needing to be expunged, in the very antithesis of 
recognition. Yet someone like Mathew, notwithstanding, found, as well as created, 
agentically, sufficient psychosocial and educational resources to resist such oppression in 
profound if fragile transformation. This included epistemic shifts – in critically challenging 
conventional wisdoms about health and well-being – alongside ontological recognition in 
claiming space, for self and others. Such movement, agency and self-formation justify some 
concept like ‘transformative learning’, although its use requires a grounding in learner 
narratives as well as in a rich and sophisticated interdisciplinary literature.     
 
To understand, in other words, Mathew’s narrative and those of other learners engaged in 
fundamental change processes, requires challenging mind-sets that separate psyche and 
society – as in aspects of critical theory (Honneth, 2007; 2009) – ontology and epistemology, 
cognition and emotion, conscious and unconscious life, individual and collective learning. 
The capacity to challenge oppression and the taken for granted is, in a narrative like 
Mathew’s – and of others, across diverse studies (Bainbridge and West, 2012) - a deeply 
intertwined emotional, relational, psychic, socio-cultural as well as cognitive process. If 
Bourdieu helps us understand how a habitus may conspire against particular kinds of people, 
from ‘non-traditional’ backgrounds, and thus the potential for TL, Honneth and Winnicott 
enable us to recognise, in vibrant ways, how learners, even those experiencing acute forms of 
wrenching and disrespect, may transform aspects of themselves and the habitus, through 
recognition. Yet narrative research, and psychosocial repertoires, remind us too of how 
human transformation is always provisional, and that worlds, selves and struggles are never 
complete. TL is in these terms a process rather than a point of arrival, given the perpetual 
fragility as well as potential resilience of our individual and collective condition.   
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